I.
Introduction
The city of Seattle lost something the day the
Seattle Supersonics (Sonics) professional basketball team was moved to Oklahoma
City. Many lamented (and still do) at the fact that the largest city in the Northwestern
part of the United States no longer had professional basketball. The departure
slashed a gaping hole in the social fabric of the community. Here, I will provide
a comprehensive summary of the National Basketball Association (NBA) relocation
process, with a particular study of the Seattle Supersonics relocation, examine
the legal ramifications of the lawsuits involving the Sonics relocation, and provide a few takeaways from the ordeal.
Over the last 20 years, the Vancouver
Grizzlies, Charlotte Hornets, and Seattle Sonics have relocated. Why did these
teams relocate? NBA teams relocate for a variety of reasons, but most teams relocate
because they are not generating enough revenue in the current market. Teams can
have low revenue due to poor attendance, lack of community interest, or the
absence of a genuine basketball facility that can help turn a profit. The
Charlotte Hornets had to move to New Orleans largely in part because they
played in an outdated facility and had poor attendance (Foster, 2002). The
struggle of the Charlotte Hornets exemplifies how a team can be driven to
relocate to a new city. The Sonics had similar problems, primarily in that they
had a poor basketball facility (Key Arena). NBA relocations take place when the
need to avoid revenue loss becomes too much for the owner to swallow. This is
the nature of any business, the NBA is a business, and thus relocations are
inevitable.
II.
The Relocation Process
A brief overview of the NBA relocation
process is important to understand when examining the Sonics departure from
Seattle. The NBA relocation process is quite the journey and the process is
outlined in the NBA Constitution. Article 9A of the NBA Constitution stipulates
that if a team wants to move, then it must submit an application to the NBA
Commissioner in writing with an enclosed check of $50,000 just to cover the
cost of any possible investigation (Rubanowitz, 1990). The Commissioner would
then establish a committee to produce an investigation to discern the reason(s)
the team wants to move (Rubanowitz, 1990). The committee would analyze whether
the proposed new geographical area is capable of supporting a team, whether it
would be a better financial situation, whether the location will have an
adverse effect on the ability of the NBA to market, and if the location will
make scheduling games difficult (Rubanowitz, 1990). The team must fully
cooperate with the committee during its investigation (Rubanowitz, 1990). Within
120 days the committee must make its recommendations to the Board of Governors,
a board having a representative from every team (usually the owner), on whether
or not the team’s application should be granted (Rubanowitz, 1990). The Board
of Governors would then meet no less than seven days and no more than 30 days
after being presented with the committee’s findings (Rubanowitz, 1990). A
simple majority vote among the Board of Governors is all that is required to
approve the relocation (Rubanowitz, 1990).
III.
The Seattle Supersonics and PBC Acquisition

Howard Shultz, the owner of Seattle
based Starbucks Coffee, bought the Sonics for approximately $200 million in 2001 (Greenberg,
2008). The team was not terribly successful on the court during his tenure as
owner. According to the Sonicsgate Documentary, Shultz ran the
organization like a coffee shop, and it failed miserably. Professional
Basketball Club (PBC), LLC bought the team from Shultz for $350 million in 2006
(Morris, 2009). PBC was a group of Oklahoma City businessmen led by Clayton
Bennett. The team played in the lackluster Key Arena, which was a major factor
that caused economic loss for the franchise. In 2008, ownership claimed the
Sonics would lose $60 million over the next two seasons if they were forced to
play in Seattle (Brunner, 2008).
A contributing factor to the loss in revenue and fan
engagement for the Sonics could be attributed to majority owner Bennett, which
created a figurative rain cloud over the team (Brunner, 2008). The community
was not interested in investing money in a team that was owned by Bennett. His
ownership, contributed to this negative image of the team, resulting in more
loss of revenue. In fact, the Sonics CEO, Danny Barth, said, “The fan apathy and our brand
recognition, . . . has been very difficult.” When he was asked to
explain where this apathy was stemming from he said, "Individuals
obviously have a problem with the fact of our ownership group and their being
from Oklahoma. The apathy towards that has been very strong." The fans were disinterested in paying money for a lame duck season and
to an owner who had ulterior motives to relocate the franchise from Seattle.
As with any business transaction, conditions and
agreements are central bargaining chips to the sale of a franchise. In the case
of the Sonics, this was no different. When Shultz sold the team to Bennett and
his group, he sold it to them under the impression that Bennett would utilize a
good faith effort to do all he could to keep the team in Seattle (Greenberg,
2008). The term “good faith” is defined as “a state of mind consisting in (1)
honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one’s duty or obligation, (3)
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade
or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage”(Garner,
1996). Bennett had a fiduciary duty “use good faith best efforts” to keep the team
in Seattle (Brunner, 2008).
IV.
The Breakdown
Bennett and his ownership group were contractually
obligated to “use good faith best efforts” to keep the team in Seattle. In
reality, this would entail ownership engaging fan confidence, managing the team
correctly, and maintaining a good working relationship with the city to get an
arena built. Bennett failed to do all of the above.
a. Engaging
Fan Confidence and Poor Team Management
As stated earlier, many fans did not trust the owner
and were suspicious of his ties to Oklahoma City. In fact, the owners
intentionally limited exposure of Sonic players to the public (Rudman, 2008).
For example, Kevin Durant had limited public appearances to the community.
Furthermore, many of Sonics top stars, such as Ray Allen and Rashard Lewis were
either traded or let go in free agency, resulting in further fan mistrust and
suspicion as the losses continued to mount. While these issues may seem minor, they are useful factors in
discerning the true intentions of the ownership group.
b. Failure to
Build an Arena: A Debacle From the Beginning
The plan to build a new sport facility to replace Key
Arena was bad from the beginning. Soon after Bennett purchased the team in 2006
he proclaimed, “Key Arena
is not a viable NBA arena. A renovated Key Arena is not a viable NBA arena. We
cannot stay in the Key Arena” (Greenberg, 2008). It was well known by many that
Key Arena was not profitable, and a new facility would
be needed for sustainability. In February of 2007, Bennett proposed to build a
new facility in Renton, Washington for approximately $530 million, $300 million
of which would be subsidized by taxpayers (Rudman 2008).
The
appropriations from public funding would come from the passage of Senate Bill
5986 (Greenberg, 2008). Senate Bill 5986, in essence, would have extended or
increased taxes to help pay off new arenas in the state (Greenberg, 2008).
Bennett first took his proposal to the city of Seattle. However, Initiative 91 stipulated
a minimum return to taxpayers from the construction of a new stadium (Greenberg,
2008). Of course, there was no guarantee of a return, and it failed at the
municipal level. Bennett then took his proposal to the Washington Legislature.
The proposal drew heavy
criticism from the Seattle community, which was a reason the Washington
Legislature decided not to pass funding. Many thought Bennett should put up
more money for the project (Reid, 2009). The price of the facility seemed way
over the top, and it did not seem like he was acting pragmatically on getting
the arena built. Additionally, the location was poorly chosen. Representative
Ross Hunter, the House Finance Committee Chair for the Washington Congress,
said, “There was a proposal to build the most expensive arena in the NBA at the
worst traffic intersection in the state of Washington” (Reid, 2009). Hunter said
that when Bennett sat in his office, he was not serious about getting an arena
passed and that he sat in silence as the lobbyist did all the talking (Reid,
2009). When Bennett’s attempt at the state level failed, he set an October 31st
deadline for an arena solution to be reached, and if one had not been reached
by then he would file intent to seek relocation (Johns
et al., 2007). In March of 2008, Microsoft CEO Jeffrey Ballmer put
up $300 million of his own money to help renovate Key Arena, but it was to no
avail, as the city could not guarantee the rest of the money (Morris, 2009).
Bennett then filed his intent to relocate. The Board of Governors approved the move in 2008. This lead to a
string of lawsuits, and the attempt to build a suitable NBA facility in Seattle
was abandoned by ownership.
V.
Discovery Reveals Intentions
A year prior to Bennett filing the intent to
relocate, the City Council unanimously passed an ordinance compelling the
Sonics to honor its lease with Key Arena through 2010 (Rudman, 2008). In 2007,
Bennett filed for arbitration arguing the Sonics should not be compelled to
stay in Key Arena through 2010 (Rudman, 2008). Tom Carr, the city attorney for
Seattle, sued Bennett arguing the Sonics needed to honor its lease with Key
Arena until 2010 (Rudman, 2008). Ultimately, the city avoided arbitration and
ended up in court challenging Bennet’s assertion in The City of Seattle v. Professional Basketball
Club LLC. Former
Sonic player Gary Payton joined thousands of fans outside the courthouse during
the trial to show his support to keep the Sonics in town (Morris, 2009).
The city argued the new ownership group
signed an Instrument of Assumption when they bought the team (Anderson, 2011).
This means they had to “assume, and hereby agrees to satisfy or perform (as
applicable), all liabilities and obligations. . . under the lease agreement” for
Key Arena (Anderson, 2011). Carr argued the new owners assumed the
responsibilities of the previous owners upon acquiring the team, and Bennett’s
fiduciary duties were inconsistent with the actions he was taking (City…, 2007). Carr stated Bennett was in violation of the lease and the agreement to
fulfill it when he filed for arbitration to get out of the lease early. The
city referenced Article II of the lease agreement, which stipulated the Sonics
play their games exclusively in Key Arena and that arbitration could not be
used to get out of the lease prematurely (Anderson, 2011). The city sought to
invoke specific performance as the remedy, hoping to force the team to play the
remaining two years in Key Arena (Anderson, 2011). The judge was to
issue a ruling on July 2, 2008.
In
April of 2008, Schultz filed suit against Bennett to rescind the sale of the
team (Rudman, 2008). Shultz had reason to believe Bennett had failed to “use
good faith best efforts” to keep the team in Seattle (Morris, 2009). This
belief was based on the discovered materials from The City of Seattle v. Professional Basketball Club LLC case. Dialogue
among owners in the PBC indicated they never intended to honor a best effort to
keep the team from moving. In February 2008, the Court compelled the PBC to
turn over all of their emails and correspondences for trial (City of Seattle v. The Professional Basketball Club, LLC, 2008). Aubrey McClendon, a former partner in the
ownership group, told the Oklahoma City Journal in 2007 that they had no
intention of ever keeping the team in Seattle when they bought them (Allen,
2007). The NBA issued a $250,000 fine to McClendon for the comments (Allen, 2007).
In fact, in April of 2007, e-mail correspondences between, Sonics minority
owner Tom Ward asked Bennett, "Is there any way to move here for next
season or are we doomed to have another lame duck season in Seattle?" and
Bennett replied, "I am a man possessed! Will do everything we can…” (Bennett,
Clay & Ward, Tom, personal communication, April 1, 2007).
The correspondences discovered in the
lawsuit, along with the poor effort to get a new facility built, served as the
basis for Shultz's lawsuit that Bennett was not operating in good faith. However,
Robert Buchanan, the Executive Vice President and General Counsel of the NBA,
referred to the “Release and Indemnification” in a court written document which
stipulated that former owners were prevented from taking future legal action
that could disrupt the management of a newly acquired team (Buchanan, 2008). Shultz
would go on to drop the lawsuit as a result of the NBA’s intervention.
As it turned out, Schultz was the city’s last hope to
save the Sonics because on July 2, two hours before the judge was supposed to
issue the ruling on the Key Arena lease, the city and the team settled. Many
fans wonder what the ruling would have been and they thought the city gave up and
let the Sonics walk away to Oklahoma City. The Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) that was agreed to among Seattle and PBC compelled Bennett to pay the
city $45 million in exchange for a termination of the lease, let the Sonics
move to Oklahoma City immediately, and make PBC pay an additional $30 million
to the city if they had not secured a new franchise on the 5th
anniversary of the MOU’s enactment (Bennett
& Carr, 2008). The NBA has made
it clear that there are no promises to Seattle to get another team in the area.
VI.
The Questions Remains
Revisionist history often leads to
more questions than it does answers, and this case study is no different. Two
important questions and one important lesson stem from this case study.
1. What would have happened had Shultz not dropped his lawsuit? Its plausible that the court could have believed that the contract was breached materially and that the sale of the team should have been rescinded, although, not likely. Shultz most likely dropped this case for good reason, because even had there been a breach of good faith, it would be hard to calculate how material the breach was and it would not likely have been enough to rescind the sale of the team.
2. What would have happened had the city of Seattle not settled the case with PBC? It is possible that the city could have kept the team in the lease for two more seasons, which would have been a good thing considering that team would have had players like Kevin Durant and Russell Westbrook.. Time is a valuable resource and it is something we never get back. If specific performance would have been granted, then Seattle would have had two more seasons of professional basketball, and it would have been more difficult for PBC to move the team.
3. Always beware of what you put in a contract and who you sell to. Shultz should have placed a covenant in the agreement that the team had to be in Seattle for a certain amount of time. I am not naïve and understand that Bennett would not have bought the team if such a covenant were in the agreement. However, one must be aware that contracts will generally be construed in a manner that is against the drafter when it comes to ambiguous terms. Good faith and best efforts is vague and Shultz should have insisted on a better standard by which to judge Bennett’s actions. At the very least, Shultz could have found another buyer to keep the team in Seattle.
1. What would have happened had Shultz not dropped his lawsuit? Its plausible that the court could have believed that the contract was breached materially and that the sale of the team should have been rescinded, although, not likely. Shultz most likely dropped this case for good reason, because even had there been a breach of good faith, it would be hard to calculate how material the breach was and it would not likely have been enough to rescind the sale of the team.
2. What would have happened had the city of Seattle not settled the case with PBC? It is possible that the city could have kept the team in the lease for two more seasons, which would have been a good thing considering that team would have had players like Kevin Durant and Russell Westbrook.. Time is a valuable resource and it is something we never get back. If specific performance would have been granted, then Seattle would have had two more seasons of professional basketball, and it would have been more difficult for PBC to move the team.
3. Always beware of what you put in a contract and who you sell to. Shultz should have placed a covenant in the agreement that the team had to be in Seattle for a certain amount of time. I am not naïve and understand that Bennett would not have bought the team if such a covenant were in the agreement. However, one must be aware that contracts will generally be construed in a manner that is against the drafter when it comes to ambiguous terms. Good faith and best efforts is vague and Shultz should have insisted on a better standard by which to judge Bennett’s actions. At the very least, Shultz could have found another buyer to keep the team in Seattle.
The Sonics played professional basketball in Seattle
for 41 years and were entangled in the social fabric of the community. Clayton
Bennett bought the team and moved them to Oklahoma City. Many felt Bennett did
not comply with the good faith covenant in the purchase-sale agreement. The
circumstantial evidence tends to point toward a concerted effort by the PBC to
move the team to Oklahoma City from the beginning. If Bennett’s intention
existed from the beginning, then it would have been all but impossible to
square that intention with the covenant to “use good faith best efforts” to keep
the team in Seattle. Nobody will ever know Court’s ruling. Shultz, the city,
and the fans fought hard for their team, but it was futile. Skepticism among
Bennett’s intentions to keep the team in Seattle will always be high, and fans will always
ask; was he really giving his best effort to keep the Sonics in Seattle?
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